JENELLE McCRAY-KELLER, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner ofSocial Security, Defendant.
No. 2:12-cv-674-EFB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DATED: September 30, 2013
ORDER
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies plaintiff's motion and grants the Commissioner's motion.
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI benefits on May 19, 2008, alleging that he had been disabled since December 15, 2007. Administrative Record ("AR") 102-109. Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on July 15, 2008, and upon reconsideration on October 24, 2008. Id. at 55-59. On February 5, 2010, a hearing was heldbefore administrative law judge ("ALJ") Mark C. Ramsey. Id. at 25-50. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he testified. Id.
On June 22, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(I), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the act.1 Id. at 12-19. The ALJ made the following specific findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2009.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 15, 2007, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
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4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
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5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the fully range of work at all exertional levels, including simple and complex work, but is restricted from public work or work in unison with fellow employees.
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6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
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7. The claimant was born on February 22, 1985 and was 22 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416963).
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocation Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (see SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
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11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 15, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ's decision, id. at 87, and on February 21, 2012, the Appeals Council denied review, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-4.
The Commissioner's decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were applied. Schneider v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); Morgan v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). "'It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
"The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). "Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) rejecting the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician in favor of the opinions from examining and non-examining sources; (2) finding that plaintiff did not satisfy the paragraph B criteria for listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.08; (3) and finding that plaintiff did not satisfy the paragraph C criteria for listings 12.02, 12.04, and 12.08. Pl.'s Mem. P & A ISO Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 15-1 at 9-18. Plaintiff further argues that theAppeals Council erred by failing to remand the matter to the ALJ in light of additional evidence submitted after the ALJ's decision. Id. at 33.2
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Lim, plaintiff's treating physician, without providing legally sufficient reasons. ECF No. 15-1 at 17-20. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected for "specific and legitimate" reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating professional's opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining professional's opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, "[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not 'substantial evidence.'" Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Russell Lim from October 14, 2008 through December 7, 2009. AR 395-419. On February 24, 2009, Dr. Lim examined plaintiff and completed a Medical Source Statement-Mental. Id. at 247-248, 406. Plaintiff reported that she continues to experience a depressed mood, irritability, and difficulty sleeping. Id. at 406. As for objective findings, Dr. Lim found that plaintiff was well-groomed, had good eye contact, displayed average mood and appropriate affect, was cognitively intact, and her insight and judgment were good. Id. Plaintiff denied suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, and auditory and visual hallucinations. Id. Dr. Lee opined that plaintiff had a poor ability to understand and remember both simple and detailed and complex instructions. Id. at 247. He further opined that plaintiff had a poor ability to carry out instructions; to attend and concentrate; work without supervision; interact with the public, coworkers and supervisors; and to adapt to changes in the work place. Id. at 247-48. He also stated that plaintiff's prognosis was "fair to good on regular use of medications." Id.
On November 10, 2007, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Bradley Daigle, a state-agency examining physician. Id. at 200-205. Dr. Daigle found that plaintiff's thought process was coherent and organized; there were no suicidal, homicidal, or paranoid ideations; mood was euthymic; affect was slightly labile; plaintiff seemed restless and outspoken; and her insight and judgment appeared to be fair regarding current problems. Id. at 202-204. Dr. Daigle diagnosed plaintiff with possible bipolar disorder, currently untreated, and probable borderline personality disorder, currently untreated. Id. at 204. He opined that plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions, and in her ability to follow detailed and complex instructions. Id. at 205. It was also his opinion that plaintiff had slight impairments in her ability to relate and interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; maintaining concentration, persistence and pace; in her ability to associate with day-today work activity, including attendance and safety; and moderately limited...
